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Jacobs: The Boyle Test Is an Insufficient Standard for Determining Whethe

NOTE
THE BOYLE TEST IS AN INSUFFICIENT
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER TO ALLOW PRIVATE MILITARY
CONTRACTORS TO ASSERT

THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no accountability for the tens of thousands of contractors
working [in] Iraq and abroad. Private contractors like Blackwater
work outside the scope of the military's chain of command and can
literally do whatever they please without any liability or
I
accountability ....
-Statement

by Kathryn Helvenston-Wettengel, the mother of a
Blackwater employee killed in the Fallujah ambush2

[T]here is simply no way at all the State Department's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security could ever have enough full-time personnel to
staff the security 3function in Iraq. There is no alternative except
through contracts.
-Statement

by Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

1. Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Status Report:
HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 71 (2007) (statement of
Kathryn Helvenston-Wettengel). Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC ("Blackwater") is a
corporation operating in Iraq, contracted to provide security services for the United States
government.
2. For the purposes of this Note, the "Fallujah ambush" and "Fallujah incident" refer to the
same event and the terms are used interchangeably. The Fallujah ambush was an attack by Iraqi
insurgents upon United States contractors working for Blackwater. Part II of this Note explores the
events of this ambush in greater detail.
3. Hearing on Blackwater USA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (prepared statement of Erik D. Prince, CEO of Blackwater) (quoting
Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents
/20071003153621.pdf.
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These quotations exemplify a growing problem arising from the
Iraq War. Private military contractors 4 are being hired in record numbers
by the United States military.5 They are contracted to perform security
functions including safeguarding perimeters, guarding convoys, and
providing private bodyguard services to diplomats and State Department
officials. 6 As a result of the military's extensive reliance on these private
military contractors, some problems, such as lack of oversight and
unclear legal standards, are beginning to surface. 7
Blackwater is one of many security contractors operating in Iraq
and Afghanistan. 8 The North Carolina-based contractor has recently
been at the center of two horrifying events in Iraq, causing a public
backlash that has resulted in Congressional investigations. 9
Subsequently, the name Blackwater has become synonymous with the
growing public concern that the United States' substantial reliance on
private military contractors offers insufficient governmental oversight,
creating a culture of lawlessness 1 0 One such example that caught the
media's attention occurred on March 31, 2004, in Fallujah, where four
employees of Blackwater were killed in an ambush." Questions still
remain as to whether Blackwater's negligence caused the1 deaths
and, if
2
so, whether the company should be immune from liability.
4. Private military contractors will also be referred to as private security contractors herein.
5. See Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Status Report:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of
Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform). Chairman
Waxman stressed that little is known about the extent of the United States' reliance on these private
security contractors. He concluded, however, that "[w]e know that the war in Iraq has given private
contractors an unprecedented role in providing security services. Almost $4 billion in taxpayer
funds has been paid for private security services in the reconstruction effort alone." Id.
6. See Brian Bennett, Outsourcing the War, TIME, Mar. 26, 2007, at 38.
7. See id. at 40.
8. Other contractors include DynCorp and Triple Canopy. See JEREMY SCAHILL,
BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY 165 (2007).
9. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 40; see also August Cole, Obstacles Await Any Charges
Against Blackwater, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A8. In addition to the Fallujah incident, the FBI

and Congress investigated another incident in which Blackwater employees were accused of
wrongfully killing seventeen Iraqi civilians. See Cole, supra, at A8. The FBI determined that "at
least 14 of the 17 Iraqi civilians in the September [2007] incident were unjustified and violated
standards in place governing the use of deadly force." Id.
10. See James Glanz, Iraq Plans to Confront Security Firms on Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2007, at A 19.
11. See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM, 110TH CONG.,
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKWATER'S ACTIONS IN

FALLUJAH

4

(Comm.

Print

2007),

available

at

http://oversight.house.gov/documents/

20070927104643.pdf [hereinafter PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS].

12. See id.
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This Note examines the legal consequences Blackwater faced in the
Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting litigation that arose out of the
Fallujah incident. 13 This Note also evaluates the current legal standard
used to determine the applicability of the government contractor
defense 14 and argues that there should be different standards for private
military contractors as opposed to supply contractors, corresponding to
the inherent differences between the two types of contracts. In response
to the insufficiency of the current legal standard, this Note proposes a
test, called the "Blackwater Rule," that is tailored to the unique
intricacies of private military contractors and intended to preserve the
initial purpose of the government contractor defense, immunizing the
government's discretion.
Part I of this Note introduces the facts that gave rise to the Fallujah
incident and the litigation that followed. Specific attention is paid to the
contractual relationship between Blackwater and the general contractors
that procured Blackwater's security services.
Part III chronicles the origins of the government contractor defense
as created by Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 5 detailing how the
defense was derived from the discretionary exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"). 16 Additionally, Part III describes in detail the
Boyle Court's three-prong government contractor defense test.
Part IV examines how different courts have interpreted Boyle,
analyzing how the lower courts have inconsistently treated the question
of whether performance contractors17 should be able to assert the
government contractor defense. Part IV concludes that a uniform rule
resolving this inconsistency is necessary in order to have a consistent
legal framework within which to address this national legal issue.
Part V argues for the adoption of the Rule proposed by this Note,
the "Blackwater Rule." The Blackwater Rule provides clear standards
for private military contractors who wish to invoke the government
contractor defense. This Part first contends that all contracts involving

13.

Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 805 (E.D.N.C. 2005).

14. The government contractor defense protects a contractor from liability when the
government exercises discretion over the contractor's conduct and the contractor subsequently
carries out the government's wishes. Part III of this Note provides a comprehensive analysis and
background of the government contractor defense.
15. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000) (codifying the FTCA); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000)
(enumerating the exceptions to the FTCA).
17. Performance contractors are contractors that perform a task or service as compared to
supply contractors that manufacture a product.
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'1 8
private military contractors involve a "uniquely federal interest."
Additionally, in order to determine if a "significant conflict"1 9 exists
between a federal interest and state law, the Blackwater Rule stipulates
that a "significant conflict" exists if: (1) the performance contract with
the government provided precise specifications and the contractor
complied with the specifications; (2) the performance contract with the
government explicitly and lawfully delegated the government's
discretion to the private military contractor; or (3) in the absence of
explicit contractual instructions, the government substantively reviewed
and approved the use of the procedure prior to the event that led to
liability.2 ° This Part will also describe the standards that private military
subcontractors would need to meet in order to assert the government
contractor defense.
Finally, Part VI of this Note will apply the Blackwater Rule to the
facts of Nordan.21 This Part illustrates how the Blackwater Rule works
and evaluates what evidence, beyond the facts that are publicly
available, would be needed in order for Blackwater to meet the
requirements of the Rule. In addition, Part VI describes how, if these
standards were met, the use of the government contractor defense would
be consistent with the discretionary rationale for which the defense was
initially created. Part VI concludes that the Blackwater Rule provides an
incentive for the government and private military contractors to develop
a system of drafting and performing security contracts with increased
oversight, transparency, and contemplation.

II.

A SERIES

THE FALLUJAH INCIDENT:
OF SUBCONTRACTS AND MISTAKES

On March 31, 2004, Scott Helvenston, Mike Teague, Jerko Gerald
Zovko, and Wesley Batalona were victims of one of the most shocking
acts of violence of the Iraq War. 2 Their convoy was ambushed in the

18. The existence of a "uniquely federal interest" is necessary to fulfill the requirements of
the first step of the Boyle test. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504. Part III of this Note provides further
explanation of this term and its relationship to the government contractor defense.
19. In addition to the "uniquely federal interest" requirement, a contractor must also prove
that there is a "significant conflict" between the federal interest and state law in order to invoke the
government contractor defense. Id. at 507.
20. The private military contractor can assert the government contractor defense if it satisfies
one of the prongs of the Blackwater Rule.
21.

Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 804-06 (E.D.N.C.

2005).
22. See PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11, at 4.
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streets of Fallujah.23 They were shot, pulled from their vehicles,
mutilated, burned, and two of their bodies were ultimately hung from a
bridge.24 A bloodthirsty mob of more than three hundred Iraqis took part,
encouraged, and stood witness to these events, which were reminiscent
of those that occurred a little over a decade before in Somalia.25 One
noteworthy difference was that private military contractors as opposed to
soldiers, were the victims of the violence.
The four victims of the violence were employees of Blackwater and
were providing security for the convoy that was ambushed2 6 The events
that preceded the Fallujah incident are becoming clearer as
Congressional investigations and lawsuits, brought by the families of
these employees, shine light on the actions taken by Blackwater prior to
the ambush.2 7 An analysis of the contractual web that led Blackwater to
assume the security function of the convoy is necessary in order to
understand how the contractor neglected its responsibilities to its
employees.
The Fallujah ambush arose from a contractual obligation between
Blackwater and Regency Hotels ("Regency"), a Kuwaiti business. 28 The
contract required Blackwater to provide security services for ESS
Support Services Worldwide ("ESS"), a European food company.2 9
Figure 1 displays the complex contractual relationship between
Regency, ESS, Kellogg, Brown & Root ("KBR"), Fluor Corporation, the
United States Army, and the United States Air Force.

23. Bennett, supra note 6, at 36.
24. Id.
25. SCAHILL, supra note 8, at 103. In 1993, Somalian rebels dragged the bodies of American
soldiers, who had been shot down in a United States Blackhawk helicopter, through the streets of
Mogadishu. Id. at 107.
26. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11, at 4.
27. See generally Iraqi Reconstruction:Reliance on Private Military Contractorsand Status
Report: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2007)
(compiling Congressional findings and testimony); see also Nordan v. Blackwater Sec. Consulting,
LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 804-06 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
28. Nordan,382 F. Supp. 2d at 804; PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11, at 7.
29. Nordan,382 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
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Figure 1: Blackwater Subcontract Diagram

US Army

US Air Force

KBR

Fluor Corp.

ESS
Regency
I
[ Blackwater]
ESS was a subcontractor under two different companies operating
in Iraq. The first company, KBR, had a Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program ("LOGCAP") contract with the United States Army. 30 A

LOGCAP contract is a type of contract made between the Army and a
contractor for non-combat services such as providing food or housing for
the military. 3' Fluor Corporation, the second company that ESS had a

subcontract with, held its general contract with the United States Air
Force. 32 Fluor's contract covered reconstruction efforts involving water
programs and restoring electricity. 33 Neither the LOGCAP contract with

KBR nor the contract between the Air Force and Fluor permitted the
general contractors to subcontract for security.34
Although complicated, this web of subcontracts is the norm in Iraq

and has resulted in a lucrative market for middlemen such as Regency.35
30. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11, at 7.
31. For a further analysis describing how the structure of LOGCAP contracts gives
contractors an incentive to inflate costs, see Erik Eckholm, Democrats Step up Criticism of
HalliburtonBilling in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2005, at A12.
32. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11, at 7.
33. See Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Status Report:
HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 133 (2007) (statement
of Tom Flores, Senior Director, Fluor Corp.).
34. See id. at 183-84.
35. See Private Security Firms Standards, Cooperationand Coordinationon the Battlefield:
Hearing before the Nat ' Sec., Emerging Threats and Int'l Relations Subcomm. of the H. Gov't
Reform Comm., 109th Cong. 5 (2006). This hearing was held to investigate the prevalent practice of
overcharging the government at every level of subcontracting. Id.
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These middlemen contract to provide services and find another
company, such as Blackwater, to actually perform the work under the
contract. As Representative Henry A. Waxman explained during the
2007 House of Representatives' investigation into contractor waste, "[i]t
is remarkable that the world of contractors and subcontractors is so
murky that we can't even get to the bottom of this, let alone calculate
how many millions of dollars taxpayers lose in each step of the
subcontracting process. 36
Blackwater represented the last link on this subcontracting chain
and assumed the role of security subcontractor under Regency.37
Blackwater inherited this contract from Control Risk Group ("CRG")
and the ambush occurred shortly following the transfer of
responsibilities from CRG to Blackwater.3 8 In fact, the victims of the
ambush were traveling on one of the first missions attempted pursuant to
this newly assigned contract.39
Many accounts of the incident, including the House of
Representatives report, suggest that Blackwater was to blame for the
unpreparedness that resulted in the deaths of its four employees. 40 The
first of these allegations is that the men were not properly trained for
their mission because Blackwater took on the contract too hastily
without learning the specifics from the prior contractor, CRG. 41 A CRG
project manager recalled that during the transition period, Blackwater
"did not use the opportunity to learn from the experience gained by CRG
on this operation, this leading to inadequate preparation for taking on
this task...,42 In addition, Blackwater's internal report conceded that
43
the personnel "[h]ad no time to perform proper mission planning.,
The second allegation against Blackwater in connection with the
Fallujah incident is that the crew was understaffed.44 According to a

36. Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Status Report:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of

Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform).
37. See PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note I1,
at 7.
38. Id.
39. Bennett, supra note 6, at 39.
40. See Press Release, Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, Incident Reports Fault
Blackwater in Fallujah Ambush (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
story.asp?ID=l 503.
41. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supra note 11, at 7.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 8.
44. Id. at 10.
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Blackwater internal report, the team size of six employees was cut to
four immediately before the team left for the convoy mission.45
The third allegation blaming Blackwater for the deaths of its
employees is that the men were not properly equipped.4 6 Instead of
driving fully armored vehicles, the Blackwater employees were driving
Mitsubishi Pajeros.47 In addition, the victims' families allege that
Blackwater "did not provide [its employees] with heavy automatic
machine guns, but instead merely with semi-automatic rifles, which had
not even been tested or sighted. 4 8 The House report also concluded that
the Blackwater employees were not given proper maps.49 The victims'
families testified before the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform that "when [Scott Helvenston] asked for a map of
the route, he was told, 'It is a little too late for a map now."' 50
Beyond these allegations of negligence, the victims' families also
contend that Blackwater breached its contract with Regency as well as
the contract between Blackwater and its own employees. 5 1 The contract
between Blackwater and Regency set minimum standards that
Blackwater needed to meet while providing security for the convoys.
The contract stated that "to provide tactically sound and fully mission
capable Protective Security Details, the minimum team size is six
operators with a minimum of two vehicles to support the ESS
movements., 52 Additionally, the contract stipulated that "[e]ach escort
team (2 vehicles) will contain a minimum of 5 personnel. 5 3 The fact
that these provisions seem to be inconsistent is irrelevant because
Blackwater failed to comply with either of these two minimum
standards. When the Fallujah incident occurred, the team size had been
cut from six operators to four.54

45.
46.
47.
vehicle.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8. The Pejero, known as the Montero in the United States, is a mid-sized sport utility
Nordan v. Blackwater See. Consulting, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 805 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supranote 11, at 8.

50. Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Status Report:

Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 73 (2007) (statement of
Kathryn Helvenston-Wettengel, Rhonda Teague, Donna Zovko, and Kristal Batalona).
51. See Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
52. Agreement for Security Services between Regency and Blackwater (Mar. 2004), at 15,
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20061207151614-43671 .pdf [hereinafter Agreement for
Security Services].
53. Id. at 20.
54. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supranote 11, at 10.
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Based on the facts publicly available, Blackwater not only deviated
from the stated terms of its contract with Regency but also failed to
comply with its employment contracts.55 The Independent Contractor
Service Agreements, made between Blackwater and its own employees,
required that "[e]ach security mission would be handled by a team of no
less than six (6) members., 56 The contract also stated that the "[s]ecurity
teams would be comprised of at least two armored vehicles, with at least
three security contractors in each vehicle ....
Neither provision was
58
followed on the date of the Fallujah ambush.
The families of the victims inquired into the circumstances
surrounding the Fallujah ambush and sought justice by filing separate
lawsuits against Blackwater. 59 The lawsuits, consolidated in Nordan,
allege that Blackwater's misconduct and breaches of contract resulted in
the wrongful deaths of the four employees. 60 The complaint argues that
the families of the victims are entitled to recover damages under a North
Carolina statute, which allows for the recovery of damages "[w]hen a
death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of
another.." 6 1
In response, Blackwater unsuccessfully argued for the removal of
the suit to federal court based on the Defense Base Act which states that
the liability of an employer, qualifying under 33 U.S.C. § 904, is limited
to the statutory death benefits.62 In addition to this defense, Blackwater
55. See Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
56. Id. at 804.
57. Id.
58.

PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supranote 11, at 10.

59. See Cannel Sileo, Suit by Families of Slain Iraq Contractors Demands Answers, TRIAL,
July 2005, at 102-05.
60. See Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (2008); see Nordan, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 803. The common
law rule of lex loci delicti commissi applies for wrongful death suits in North Carolina and thus the
law of the place where the wrong took place, and not North Carolina law, should be applied. See
Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849, 853-54 (N.C. 1988). However, recent cases, applying this
rule, have centered on the question of which state law to apply and not the choice between North
Carolina law and the law of a foreign country. See, e.g., id. (involving a dispute over whether to
apply Florida or North Carolina law). As a result of the lack of case law on point and the
unchallenged use of North Carolina law in Nordan, this Note assumes that the application of the
North Carolina wrongful death statute is proper.
62. 33 U.S.C. § 904 (2000). The Defense Base Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
Although this defense will likely be invoked by Blackwater in addition to the government contractor
defense, this Note will only focus on the government contractor defense. For more information on
the likelihood that Blackwater will succeed in raising the Defense Base Act defense in Nordan, see
Jeffrey F. Addicott, Contractors on the "Battlefield:" Providing Adequate Protection, AntiTerrorism Training, and Personnel Recovery for Civilian ContractorsAccompanying the Military
in Combat and Contingency Operations,28 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 323, 368 (2006). See also Fisher v.
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has also claimed immunity under the government contractor defense,
which would preempt the state law claim. 63 If the North Carolina court
agrees with the security contractor, this defense would completely
immunize Blackwater from liability.
The government contractor defense has a well-developed history
which resulted in a comprehensive rule used to determine if the defense
applies in cases involving supply contracts. The Supreme Court,
however, has yet to define a comparable rule for performance
contractors. Consequently, Nordan represents the heart of this
controversy and may be the forum in which this issue is decided. Should
private security contractors, fulfilling performance contracts for the
government, be able to assert immunity in order to defend against claims
arising from their contractual obligations? If so, what standards should
be used to determine if this rule can be invoked? The following two
Parts of this Note explore how the courts have failed to provide a
consistent answer to these questions, and Part v. offers a possible
solution to this controversial issue.
III.

THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE WAS CREATED TO

IMMUNIZE GOVERNMENTAL DISCRETION

The government contractor defense was created in Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.64 In Boyle, the father of a United States Marine
helicopter co-pilot brought wrongful death claims against the helicopter
manufacturer, the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies
Corporation ("Sikorsky"). 65 The suit arose from a helicopter crash in
which the co-pilot survived the impact of the crash but subsequently
drowned when he could not escape from the aircraft.66 The complaint
alleged that Sikorksy defectively designed the escape hatch. The plaintiff
contended that the door was ineffective when submerged under water
because it opened outward instead of inward so that water pressure
prevented the door from opening.6 7 In response, Sikorsky argued that
because the government gave the corporation reasonably precise

Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613-14 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that the Defense Base Act does
not apply when an employer acts with the specific intent to injure its employees).
63. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 29, Blackwater Sec. Consulting v. Nordan, Nos. 05-2033,
05-2034 (4th Cir. Oct. 31, 2005).
64. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
65. Id. at 502.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 503.
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specifications as to the design of the escape system, it was immune from
liability under the "military contractor defense. 6 8
Step one of the Boyle Court's application of the government
contractor defense centered on whether federal law preempted the state
law claim.69 Prior to Boyle, the Supreme Court, in most areas, refused to
find federal preemption in the absence of either a clear statutory
prescription or a direct conflict between federal and state law. 70 The
Court, however, recognized an exception to this rule for a few areas
involving "uniquely federal interests," so committed to "federal control
that state law is pre-empted and replaced ....
The Boyle Court concluded that the liability arising from the
fulfillment of a government contract is one of these areas involving
"uniquely federal interests. 72 State laws imposing liability on federal
government contractors involve an area of "uniquely federal interests"
because the cost of this liability would be transferred to the federal
government. The Court reasoned that "[t]he imposition of liability on
Government contractors will directly affect the terms of Government
contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture the design
specified by the Government, or it will raise its price., 73 The Boyle
Court concluded that "[e]ither way, the interests of the United States will
be directly affected., 74 Simply stated, the rule emerging from Boyle
states that when state law imposes liability on a federal government
contractor the law infringes on an area involving "uniquely federal
interests. 75
The

existence

of

a

"uniquely

federal

interest ....merely

establishes a necessary, not sufficient, condition for the displacement of
state law." 76 In order for displacement to occur, there must be a
significant conflict between the state law and the federal policy or
77

interest.

Step two of the Boyle Court's analysis determines whether a
significant conflict exists between this "uniquely federal interest" and

68. Id. Prior to Boyle the government contractor defense was also referred to as the "military
contractor defense." Id.
69. See id. at 504.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 505-06.
73. Id. at 507.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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the state law.78 The Boyle Court analyzed an exception to the FTCA in
order to determine if a "significant conflict" existed between the federal
interests and the state law.79 The FTCA authorizes claims against the
United States for the recovery of damages caused by the negligent or
wrongful conduct of government employees.80 An exception to the
FTCA, however, was drafted in order to preserve immunity when
government negligence occurs in situations where the government
exercises discretion in balancing many technical considerations. The
discretionary exception to the FTCA states that the government is
immune from suit for "[a]ny claim... based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."'', The
purpose of this exception was to prevent state courts from secondguessing complicated federal decisions.8 2
The Court in Boyle relied upon this exception to the FTCA in order
to identify the existence of a significant conflict between federal
interests and state law. 3 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
reasoned that to impose liability on contractors who were merely
following the government's orders would "produce the same effect
sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption," because the overall cost
of litigation would be passed on to the government.8 4 The Court added
that "[i]t makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial
liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment
is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but
not when it contracts for the production."8 5 Subsequently, the Court
concluded that in order to preserve the purpose of the discretionary
exception to the FTCA, immunity must be transferred to contractors in
situations where they are merely exercising the discretion of the
government. 86 When the exception to the FTCA applies, as was the case
in Boyle, there is a "significant conflict" between federal interests and

78.
79.

See id.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000). See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (discussing the FTCA).

80. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). This statute was enacted to minimize the scope of federal sovereign
immunity in which the government is immune from all suits unless it has consented to be sued.
81. Id. § 2680(a) (2000).
82. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
83. Id. at 512.
84.

Id. at 511-12.

85.
86.

Id. at 512.
Id. at 511.
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state law. 87 In cases involving a "significant conflict," state law is
displaced and the state cause of action will be dismissed.
Step two of the Boyle test establishes a three-prong rule for
determining whether a "significant conflict" exists between state law and
the federal interests described in the discretionary exception to the
FTCA. 88 This rule states that a contractor is immune from liability
"when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment
that were known to the supplier but not to the United States."89 As the
Court explained, "[t]he first two of these conditions assure that the suit is
within the area where the policy of the 'discretionary function' would be
frustrated.. .90 The third condition was established to prevent abuse of
the immunity conveyed in the defense. 91
The Court in Boyle reiterated its emphasis on governmental
discretion as the key factor in applying the government contractor
defense by distinguishing the Boyle test from the doctrine created in
Feres v. United States.92 Feres consolidated three separate cases. In
each, the plaintiff was a member of the armed forces, on active duty, and
injured as a result of the negligence of another member of the armed
forces.9 3 The Feres Court held that "the Government is not liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. 94 The
Feres Court concluded that the government is immune from liability
arising from the negligent conduct of members of the military because
the relationship between the government and military personnel is
exclusively controlled by federal law.95 The Court reasoned that the
FTCA did not alter the supremacy of federal law because Congress did

87. Id. at 512.
88. See id. It is important to note that since Boyle involved liability arising from a supply
contract, the test created in Boyle is explicitly tailored to address design defects in military
equipment.
89. Id. All three of these conditions must be met in order to meet the requirements of the
Boyle test.
90. Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
See id. at 510; Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
Id. at 146. The term "service" within this quotation refers to military service. Id.
See id. at 145.
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not explicitly create a new state law cause of action for military
*
96
injuries.
Thirty-eight years after Feres, the Court in Boyle was reluctant to
extend this theory of immunity to contractors because it was both too
broadly and too narrowly defined. The immunity was too broad because
any time the government purchased equipment, even when the
government had no say in its design, the contractor would be immune
from all suits in connection with the use of the product. 97 The immunity
was also too narrow because it limited the application of the defense to
litigation arising from injuries to military personnel.9 8 As a result,
government contractors would not be able to invoke the government
contractor defense in suits brought by civilians, even when the
contractor was directly following the government's instructions.99 In
assessing these problems, the Boyle Court rejected the Feres doctrine as
the foundation for the government contractor defense and instead
grounded the defense in the discretionary exception to the FTCA.'0 ° As a
result, based on Boyle, government contractors are permitted to assert
the government contractor defense in cases brought by both service
members and civilians, as long as the government exercised its
discretion in directing the contractors' activities.
The Boyle Court explained that this was the proper scope of the
defense because the government was exercising sufficient control over
the contract and the contractor was merely exercising the will of the
sovereign. 10 1 The Court reasoned that in these cases the contractor
should be immune from liability as if the government itself was
producing the equipment. 102 Based on the Supreme Court's strong
emphasis on governmental discretion as a necessary element for
invoking the government contractor defense, any future application of
the defense should be consistent with this principle.

96. Id. In addition, the Feres Court found that federal remedies in the form of compensation
systems were a superior means of compensating for these types of injuries. Id.
97.
98.

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
Id. at 510-11.

99. Id.
100.
101.

See id.
Seeid. at511-12.

102. See id. at 512. The Boyle Court ultimately remanded the case to ensure that the lower
court's decision was based on a determination that no reasonable jury could have found, based on
the facts that the defendant, Sikorsky, failed to meet the standards of the government contractor
defense test. See id. at 514.
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IV.

POST-BOYLE DEVELOPMENTS

Following the creation of the government contractor defense in
Boyle, lower courts have inconsistently interpreted how the rule should
be applied to performance contracts.10 3 Some lower courts have held that
the government contractor defense cannot be asserted by performance
contractors because Boyle only created the government contractor
defense for cases involving supply contracts. 0 4 Other courts have held
that the government contractor defense can be invoked by performance
contractors as long as the contractor meets the requirements of step one
and all three prongs of step two of the Boyle test. 10 5 An analysis of these
inconsistent treatments demonstrates the need for a uniform national rule
in order to determine if and when a performance contractor can assert
the government contractor defense.
Although a majority of courts have accepted the proposition that
the government contractor defense can be invoked by performance
contractors, some district courts have been reluctant to extend immunity
to these contractors. 0 6 For example, in Fisher v. Halliburton, truck
drivers or surviving family members alleged that Halliburton, a
company providing services to the United States Army, used them as a
decoy for another convoy. 10 7 The truck drivers sued Halliburton for the
resulting injuries that occurred after they were attacked by antiAmerican insurgents in Iraq. 0 8 Defendant Halliburton argued for the
application of the government contractor defense and the court refused
to extend the defense to the performance contractor, concluding that the
work performed by performance contractors does not fall within the
discretionary exception to the FTCA. 0 9 The court rejected the
government contractor defense, concluding that the defendants cited no
cases in which an exception to the FTCA barred "claims against a
defense contractor other than in situations in which the contractor has
provided allegedly defective products, and this Court's research has

103. See, e.g., Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Hudgens v.
Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (1 lthCir. 2003). For the purposes of this Note,
supply contracts refer to contracts involving the manufacturing of a product whereas performance
contracts refer to contracts that require the contractor to perform a task or service for the
government.
104. See, e.g., Fisher,390 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
105. See, e.g., Hudgens, 328 F.3dat 1334.
106. See, e.g., Fisher,390 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
107. Id.at612.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 615-16.
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found none."' 11 The Texas district court was unwilling to extend the
government contractor defense to any situation beyond the facts of
Boyle, subsequently restricting the defense to those fulfilling supply
contracts.
Other district courts have similarly limited the government
contractor defense to the facts of Boyle. In Amtreco, Inc. v. O.H.
Materials, Inc., a Georgia district court held that the government
contractor defense could not be applied to performance contracts."] In
Amtreco, the owners of property upon which the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") conducted a clean-up operation sued the
contractor that performed the clean-up operation for property
damages.1 2 The contractor sought to have the cause of action dismissed
by asserting the government contractor defense.' 13 The court refused to
extend immunity to the contractor because it concluded that there is no
comparison between a design defect resulting from a supply contract and
a claim of intentional misconduct stemming from a performance
contract. 114 This decision, just as in Fisher, reinforced a stringent
distinction between supply and performance contracts, limiting the
government contractor defense to supply contractors.
The Ninth Circuit has issued decisions with similar rhetoric but has
yet to deny the government contractor defense to a contractor fulfilling a
military-related performance contract.11 5 In Snell v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, the court was presented with the issue of whether the defendant,
Bell, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the
government contractor defense. 1 6 The court stated that the government
contractor defense "is only available to contractors who design and
manufacture military equipment."' 1 7 Although Snell did not actually
present the question of whether performance contractors, performing
tasks for the military, could use the government contractor defense, the
rhetoric of the court suggests that it would be unwilling to allow any
performance contractor to invoke the defense. As a result, it appears that
the Ninth Circuit is willing to limit the government contractor defense to

110. Id.

111. 802 F. Supp. 443,445 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
112. Id. at 444-45.
113. Id.at445.
114. Id.
115. See Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 107 F.3d 744, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Hawaii
Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1992).
116. Snell, 107 F.3d at 746.
117. Id. at 746 n.1.
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the facts of Boyle, restricting military performance contractors from
being able to raise the defense.
Contrary to these decisions, a majority of lower courts assessing the
issue of whether performance contractors are protected by the
government contractor defense have concluded that performance
contractors are protected by the defense as long as governmental
discretion is exercised."18 For example, in Hudgens v. Bell
Helicopter/Textron, the court held that the government contractor
defense could be used to defend against a lawsuit resulting from
improper helicopter maintenance. 19 In this case, Army helicopter pilots
brought a suit against a maintenance contractor. 12 The court concluded
that "[a]lthough Boyle referred specifically to [supply] contracts, the
analysis it requires is not designed to promote all-or-nothing rules
regarding different classes of contract.' 2 1 The court applied the Boyle
test and held that since the "formulation of design specifications and the
articulation of maintenance protocols involve the exercise of the very
same [governmental] discretion" as was meant to be protected by the
government contractor defense, the performance contractor met the
22
requirements of the Boyle test and was immune from liability.
Richland-Lexington Airport District v. Atlas Properties, Inc. was
another case in which a lower court extended the government contractor
defense to a performance contractor. 123 This case involved a property
damage suit brought by a landowner against a contractor employed to
clean-up a hazardous waste site for the EPA. 124 As a result, the court was
presented with the issue of whether to apply the Boyle test to a
nonmilitary performance contractor. In response to the first question of
whether to allow nonmilitary contractors to assert the defense, the court
concluded that, "[t]he United States is extending its sovereign immunity
to the contractor, and there is simply no reason why a nonmilitary
contractor should be barred from enjoying this extension .... ,, 125 In
118.

See, e.g., Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (lth Cir. 2003)

(holding that a helicopter maintenance contractor could assert the government contractor defense).
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1334. Judicial opinions, as in this case, often refer to supply contracts as

procurement contracts and performance contracts as service contracts. For the purposes of this Note,
the nomenclature used by the courts is adjusted in order to maintain consistency when referring to
these specific types of contracts.
122. Id. at 1334, 1345.
123. Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 400, 422-23 (D.S.C.
1994).
124. Id. at 405-06.
125. Id.at421.
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response to the second question of whether to allow performance
contractors to assert the defense, the court concluded, "[t]he dispositive
issue is not one of performance versus [supply], but whether there is a
uniquely federal interest in the subject matter of the contract." 126 In this
case, the court found that a "uniquely federal interest" existed and
applied the Boyle test. 127 The court concluded that the Boyle test was met
because the EPA approved the site for clean-up, determined the best
method to execute the clean-up, and determined the location of the
stockpile.1 28 These specifications were precise enough to meet the Boyle
test and the court dismissed the claim against the contractor based on the
government contractor defense. 129 Richland-Lexington is a representative
case in which the court was willing to extend the government contractor
defense to a performance contractor and used
the test created in Boyle to
1 30
defense.
the
of
applicability
the
determine
Another case that addressed this question in the context of a
performance contractor performing a military-related contract was Askir
v.Brown & Root Service Corp. 3 1 In Askir, the plaintiff alleged that his
property was unlawfully possessed by a contractor providing logistical
support for the United States and the United Nations in Somalia. 132 The
court applied the Boyle test and concluded that,
both the United States and the United Nations approved "reasonably
precise specifications" for defendant Brown & Root's logistics support
activities at the Compound ....[and,] at all times during its

participation in the Somalian operation, defendant Brown & Root
operated under 133
the direction and control of the United States and the
United Nations.

126. Id.at422.
127. Id.at 423.
128. Id.
129. Id.at 424.
130. Other courts have also been willing to apply the Boyle test to the operator of a gaseous
diffusion plant, the operator of a metals production plant, and a security guard. Guillory v. Ree's
Contract Serv., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 344, 346 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (stating that "this court finds more
persuasive the reasoning of those courts which have determined that the defense applies to all
contractors, not just military contractors, and that it applies to performance contracts, not just
[supply] contracts"); Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 966 n.7 (W.D.
Ky. 1993) (stating that "this Court finds no reason to limit Boyle to [supply] contracts, as opposed to
performance contracts"); Crawford v. Nat'l Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 439, 445-46 n.7 (S.D. Ohio
1989) (holding that "[a]lthough the Boyle court discussed the government contractor defense within
the context of a [supply] contract, the defense is viable with regard to performance contracts").
131. No. 95 Civ. 11008, 1997 WL 598587 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
132. ld.at*l.
133. Id.at*6.
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The court found that this evidence was sufficient to meet the Boyle 1 test
34
and dismissed the claim based on the government contractor defense.
The disparate approaches taken by different lower courts in
determining whether the government contractor defense can be asserted
by a performance contractor have resulted in a murky legal standard. As
a result, a contractor might not be able to invoke the government
contractor defense in one jurisdiction although, based on the same facts,
the contractor would be able to assert the defense in a different
jurisdiction. These inconsistencies have led to great uncertainty for
performance contractors fulfilling contracts that are not confined to one
state or region, but are rather national and international in scope. A
uniform rule must be articulated by the Supreme Court or Congress in
order to have a consistent legal framework within which to address this
135
national legal issue.

V.

THE "BLACKWATER RULE": A LEGAL STANDARD TAILORED TO
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS
The Blackwater Rule may be stated as follows:

The government contractor defense can be invoked by a private
military contractor if:
(1) the performance contract with the government provided
precise specifications and the contractor complied with the
specifications,
(2) the performance contract with the government explicitly and
lawfully delegated the government's discretion to the private
military contractor, or
(3) in the absence of explicit contractual instructions, the
government substantively reviewed and approved the use of the
procedure prior to the event that led to liability.
The Blackwater Rule incorporates the first step of the Boyle test
because this step applies to performance and supply contracts alike.' 36

134. Id.
135. Congress would usually be the preferred choice for the articulation of a uniform national
rule. However, given that the government contractor defense was born from federal common law
and the federal legislature has since been silent on this issue, the Supreme Court seems more likely
than Congress to resolve this issue.
136. Relying on Yearsley, in which the Supreme Court held that a dam construction contractor
was not liable for damages that arose from its government contract, the Court in Boyle held that the
"uniquely federal interest" in supply contracts exists to the same extent as the "uniquely federal
interest" in performance contracts. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988);
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940).
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The Blackwater Rule, however, replaces the entire second step of the
Boyle test with a new three-pronged test that is tailored to the intricacies
of private military contractors as opposed to supply contractors. Despite
this difference, the Blackwater Rule maintains the same aim of the
second step of the Boyle test, protecting defendants that exercise the
government's discretion.
According to Boyle, the first step of the inquiry as to whether a
contractor can assert the government contractor defense is to determine
if the conduct in question involves "uniquely federal interests" so
committed to "federal control that state law is pre-empted and
replaced., 137 The Boyle Court concluded that state laws imposing
liability on federal government contractors involved an area of "uniquely
federal interests" because the cost of this liability would be transferred to
the federal government.1 38 The Court reasoned that "[t]he imposition of
liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of
Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture39
the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its price.'0
Private military contractors will always meet the requirements of this
first step because the contractors' vulnerability to lawsuits involves an
area of "uniquely federal interests," in that the resulting costs directly
affect the terms of the government's contracts.
Another reason the use of private military contractors involves
"uniquely federal interests" is that the contractors provide military-type
services which are typically a federal governmental function. The United
States Constitution places the responsibility of waging war on the
federal government. 140 The federal government has recently decided to
allow private military contractors to assist in this duty and, as a result,
contractors have become a necessary piece of the United States war
machine. 14' Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, stated that the
United States could not perform the security functions needed in Iraq
without private military contractors. 42 In fact, over half of the
137. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504. This is a concise summary of the first step of the Boyle test,
discussed in greater detail in Part III of this Note.
138. Seeid. at507.
139. Id.
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 13; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.
141. See Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised
Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 549, 554
(2005).
142. Hearing on Blackwater USA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (prepared statement of Erik D. Prince, CEO of Blackwater) (quoting
Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20071003153621.pdf.
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reconstruction contracts examined by the Government Accountability
Office in July of 2005 contained security costs in excess of fifteen
percent of the total contract. 143 This substantial reliance on private
military contractors has resulted in a scenario in which the military
efforts of the United States would be irreparably harmed if private
military contractors were unable to carry out the tasks assigned to them
by the military. As a result, the federal government has a "uniquely
federal interest" in ensuring they can continue to provide these services
without undue restraints. 144 The unique federal interests standard is thus
satisfied in all cases involving private military contractors because the
cost of liability would be transferred to the federal government and the
contractors that provide military-type services, an inherently federal
governmental function.
The second step of the government contractor defense inquiry is to
determine whether the conflict between the federal interest and the state
law is a "significant conflict. 1 45 In Boyle, the Court concluded that if the
government exercised discretion, consistent with the purpose of the
FTCA, then there is a "significant conflict" between the federal interest
and state law, and the state law is displaced.146 Boyle created a threeprong test that set standards to deternine whether the government
exercised discretion consistent with the purpose of the discretionary
exception. 147 The Boyle test has been widely used by the lower courts
148
with fairly consistent results in cases involving supply contracts.
Despite being a comprehensive test for supply contractors, however, the
Boyle test is insufficient when used to determine if the conduct of a
performance contractor falls within the definition of the discretionary
exception to the FTCA. The reason for this shortcoming is that the Boyle
test was never designed to evaluate the conduct of performance
contractors, and the differences between the two types of contracts
makes it difficult to apply the Boyle test in this way. 149 As a result of the

143. See Memorandum from the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform 2 (Feb. 7, 2007)
(on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
144. Cf Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (postulating the economic impact of contractor liability absent
immunity).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 512.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 140 F.3d 654, 658-60 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying the
Boyle test to determine if the government contractor defense immunized the manufacturer of an
Army helicopter).
149. The Boyle Court explicitly tailored the rule to cover "design defects in military
equipment." Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
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inherent differences between supply and performance contracts, a
separate rule for performance contractors is needed.
One major difference between supply and performance contracts is
that supply contracts are typically much more specific than performance
contracts. In fact, supply contracts almost always detail every feature of
the product sought by the government, even down to the exact ball
bearings to be used in a helicopter engine. 150 The level of specificity in
these contracts makes it easy to establish when the government exercises
its discretion in approving a design.
In contrast, performance contracts can be far less detailed,
especially when they involve the conduct of security companies.' For
example, the contract that gave rise to the action in Guillory v. Ree's
Contract Service, Inc., provided for flexible standards governing the
actions of the security guards. 52 The contract assigned duties including
"maintain[ing] law and order" and performing such "functions as may be
necessary in 153
the event of situations or occurrences such as civil
'
disturbances."
The differences between the level of specificity in performance and
supply contracts makes it difficult to apply a uniform standard to both
types of contracts in order to determine if the government exercised
discretion. The lack of specificity in supply contracts means the
government did not exercise its discretion whereas the lack of specificity
in performance contracts may have resulted from the government
exercising its discretion. Supply contracts are drafted in explicit detail
because all of the conditions faced by the contractor are known at the
time the contract is drafted and the government is able to specify exactly
how the equipment will be built. If the government fails to specify
whether it would like a helicopter door to open in or out, the reason for
this omission is that the government did not exercise its discretion in the
design of the helicopter door. As a result, the Boyle test, which uses the
presence of precise specifications as a means of determining whether the
government exercised discretion in the design of the equipment, is a
sufficient standard for supply contracts.

150. See, e.g., Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir. 1990) (the Army
approved the incorporation of ball bearing number 6876008 into the T63 engine that allegedly
caused the plaintiff's injuries).
151. See, e.g., Guillory v. Ree's Contract Serv., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 344, 347 (S.D. Miss. 1994)
(illustrating the lack of specificity in a contract governing the conduct of security guards).
152. Id.
153.

Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss4/12

22

Jacobs: The Boyle Test Is an Insufficient Standard for Determining Whethe
2008]

THE BOYLE TESTIS AN INSUFFICIENTSTANDARD

However, the lack of specificity in performance contracts is not
always an indication that the government failed to exercise discretion in
directing the conduct of the contractor. This is especially true for
contracts governing the conduct of private military contractors. In most
cases, it is impossible for the government to anticipate, at the time the
contract is drafted, all of the scenarios a private military contractor will
face. As opposed to supply contractors, the situations faced by private
military contractors are similar to those encountered by military field
commanders in the line of duty. 154 When planning to engage an enemy
in an unpredictable environment, the military allows its field
commanders to use their best judgment on the ground, instead of
prescribing a specific course of action. Based on the similarities between
the work performed by private military contractors and that performed
by the military itself, the government may decide that it would prefer to
treat the contractors similarly to members of the military, allowing the
contractors to act based on their own judgment in unforeseeable
situations. If the government was forced to describe precise
specifications for these scenarios, governmental discretion would be
greatly hindered and the United States' military effort could be
negatively affected. As a result, the Boyle test, which uses the presence
of precise specifications as a means of determining whether the
government exercised discretion, is an insufficient standard to govern
the conduct of private military contracts because the lack of precise
specifications in these contracts could be the direct result of
governmental discretion.
The inability of the Boyle test to sufficiently determine whether the
government exercised discretion in directing the conduct of performance
contractors, such as private military contractors, necessitates a rule
tailored to performance contractors in order to protect the government's
discretion. The Rule proposed by this Note is intended to fill this void.
The Blackwater Rule has the same aim as the Boyle test, to determine if
governmental discretion was exercised consistent with the purpose of the
discretionary exception to the FTCA. However, unlike the Boyle test, the
Blackwater Rule is designed to evaluate the conduct of performance
contractors and in particular the conduct of private military contractors.
154. In fact, if the government chose not to use private military contractors, the tasks
performed by these contractors would be assumed by the military, which at the present time is
unable to staff the security function in Iraq. See Hearing on Blackwater USA: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (prepared statement of Erik D. Prince,
CEO of Blackwater) (quoting Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071003153621 .pdf.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2008

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 12
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1377

The discretionary exception to the FTCA states that the government
is immune from suit for "any claim ... based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 1 55 The
Boyle Court emphasized the discretionary aspect of the law and created a
rule to determine if the government exercised discretion when
authorizing the contractor to perform the task in question. The
Blackwater Rule similarly seeks to determine if the government
exercised discretion when drafting a contract with a private military
contractor. The difference between the two tests is that the Blackwater
Rule allows the government to prove that it exercised its discretion in
more ways than the Boyle test, which requires that the contract must
state precise specifications. As a result, the Blackwater Rule permits the
government to exercise more discretion by not forcing federal agencies
to limit contractors to specific courses of action in cases where the
government would prefer the contractors to evaluate a given scenario
and make decisions based on conditions on the ground.
The Rule proposed by this Note stipulates that the government
contractor defense can be invoked by a private military contractor if (1)
the performance contract with the government provided precise
specifications and the contractor complied with the specifications, (2)
the performance contract with the government explicitly and lawfully
delegated the government's discretion to the private military contractor,
or (3) in the absence of explicit contractual instructions, the government
substantively reviewed and approved the use of the procedure prior to
the event that led to liability.156 If any one of these three prongs is met
there is sufficient evidence that the government exercised its discretion,
consistent with the purpose of the discretionary exception to the FTCA,
and the contractor can successfully invoke the government contractor
defense in order to dismiss the state law claim.
The first prong of the Blackwater Rule states that the government
contractor defense can be invoked by a private military contractor if the
performance contract with the government provided precise
specifications and the contractor complied with the specifications. This
prong originates from the entirety of the Boyle test. The Boyle test
requires that the "United States approved reasonably precise
155.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).

156.

Governmental approval can be either explicit or implied. Also, this third prong requires

extensive governmental oversight in order for the government to substantively review and approve
of the use of the procedure prior to the event that led to the potential liability.
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157
specifications" and the equipment conformed to these specifications.
The Court concluded in Boyle that these two conditions "assure that the
suit is within the area where the policy of the 'discretionary function'
would be frustrated . ,, Similarly, the first prong of the Blackwater
Rule ensures that the government exercised its discretion by directing
the precise conduct of the contractor.
After Boyle, every court that has been willing to apply the
government contractor defense to performance contracts has used this
standard to determine if the defense was applicable. 59 In Hudgens, the
court found that the government gave a helicopter maintenance
contractor reasonably precise specifications set forth in the detailed and
lengthy "Army Maintenance Instructions" and "Phased Maintenance
Checklist.' 160 Similarly, in Richland-Lexington, the court concluded that
the Boyle test was met by a contractor cleaning up a waste site because
to
the EPA approved the site for clean-up, determined the best method
61
execute the clean-up and determined the location of the stockpile.'
For these cases, the precise specifications requirement was an
appropriate means of determining whether the government exercised
discretion over the contractor's conduct because the tasks that needed to
be performed were predictable. As a result, the government was able to
anticipate and specify the exact procedure to be used by the contractors
in order to achieve the goals of the contracts. Given the foreseeable
nature of the work, this standard remains sufficient for determining
whether a non-private military 62performance contractor can assert the
government contractor defense. 1
It is much more difficult to precisely define and direct the conduct
performed by private military contractors as compared to that of the
maintenance and clean-up contractors in Hudgens and RichlandLexington. Contractors such as those in Hudgens and RichlandLexington perform jobs that are predictable, and thus the conduct of the
contractors can be reduced to manuals and explicit instructions. In
157. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2003)
(applying the Boyle test to determine if the performance contractor met the requirements of the
government contractor defense).
160. Id. at 1336.
161. Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 400, 423-24 (D.S.C.
1994).
162. The first prong of the Blackwater Rule is also an appropriate standard for determining if a
private military contractor can assert the government contractor defense as long as the use of the
procedure in question was foreseeable at the time the contract was drafted and the procedure was
precisely defined in the contract.
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contrast, private military contractors, for the most part, perform
unpredictable functions such as safeguarding perimeters that are subject
to attack by enemy forces. As a result, the last two prongs of the
Blackwater Rule are tailored to the unique characteristics of private
military contractors. The second and third prongs of the Blackwater Rule
are intended to give greater protection to the government's discretion by
allowing the government to exercise its discretion in ways other than
stipulating the exact manner in which each task must be completed.
The second prong of the Blackwater Rule enables a private military
contractor to assert the government contractor defense if the
performance contract with the government explicitly and lawfully
delegated the government's discretion to the private military contractor.
If the requirements of this prong are met, the contractor is immune from
liability because it was merely following a governmental discretionary
decision. As stated in Boyle, contractors are not liable for fulfilling
contracts when the government, if it had carried out the task itself, would
have been insulated against financial liability. 163 The Court concluded
that to allow "state tort suits against contractors would produce the same
' 64
effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA [discretionary] exemption."'
The resulting rule is that when the government makes a discretionary
decision that falls within the discretionary exception to the FTCA, a
contractor cannot be held liable for following the government's
instructions.
The rule developed in Berkovitz v. United States, created to
determine when a decision falls within the discretionary exception to the
FTCA, provides the framework for the second prong of the Blackwater
Rule. 65 In order for a decision that is made by a government agency to
fall within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, the
decision must be "the product of judgment or choice ....,,6 In addition,

the decision must be of a kind "that the discretionary function exception
was designed to shield."' 167 The Berkovitz Court concluded that the
exception was intended to "'prevent judicial "second-guessing" of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic,
and political policy through the medium of an action in tort."" 168 As a

163. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
164. Id. at 511.
165. 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). For the discretionary exception to the FTCA, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (2000).
166.. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 536-37 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss4/12

26

Jacobs: The Boyle Test Is an Insufficient Standard for Determining Whethe
2008]

THE BOYLE TESTIS AN INSUFFICIENTSTANDARD

result, the exception protects "governmental actions and decisions based
1 69
on considerations of public policy.
The government's decision to allow private military contractors to
use their own judgment in order to react to unique situations in war
zones meets the requirements of the Berkovitz test. The decision
certainly involves an element of judgment and choice. There is no statute
governing how military agencies draft the security provisions contained
in private military contracts. Instead, government officials who are
entrusted with the responsibility of drafting these contracts are given
broad discretion to balance many technical, military, and public
considerations in order to best utilize the government's and the
contractor's resources. The decision not to tie the hands of private
military contractors who are reacting to unpredictable situations is just
one of many judgment calls that these government officials are entrusted
to make on a daily basis.
In addition to being a decision that involves an element of choice,
the decision to allow private military contractors to use their own
discretion in the field is also the type of judgment the discretionary
exception of the FTCA was intended to protect from the secondguessing of state court judges. The military, given its expertise in
allocating resources in order to defeat foreign threats, is best equipped to
determine how private military contractors should act in the field. If the
military decides that it is beneficial to allow contractors to use their own
judgment in certain situations, the discretionary exception to the FTCA
is intended to prevent the judicial "second-guessing" of these decisions.
As a result, the decision by the military to allow private military
contractors to use their judgment falls within the discretionary exception
to the FTCA. Since the government exercises its discretion within the
definition of the discretionary exception to the FTCA, a private military
contractor that makes a judgment call, in accordance with its contract, is
protected by the second prong of the Blackwater Rule.
One potential criticism of the second prong of the Blackwater Rule
is that private military contractors would be given free reign to conduct
themselves as they please without the fear of legal accountability.
Despite this contention, there is an outer limit to the Rule. The second
prong requires that the government's discretion was lawfully delegated
to the private military contractor. As a result, a contractor who exceeded
the limits of what is permitted of the military could not assert the
government contractor defense because the military could not have
169. Id. at 537.
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lawfully authorized conduct that it could not have performed itself. For
example, since torture is a violation of an international norm, the
military is not permitted to torture enemy soldiers.17 ° Torture cannot be
lawfully delegated to a contractor because the military does not have the
authority to torture. If the government fails to lawfully delegate its
discretion, the private military contractor cannot meet the requirements
of the second prong of the Blackwater Rule.
In Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., the Court held that "if
[the] authority to carry out a project was validly conferred, that is, if
what was done was within the constitutional powers of Congress, there
17 1
is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will.,,
Although this rule has been subsequently eroded by decisions such as
Boyle, 172 it still stands for an outer limit that the government cannot
delegate a duty when it has no constitutional power to do so. Based on
this limitation, and contrary to the possible criticism that the second
prong of the Blackwater Rule might allow private military contractors to
operate in a world of lawlessness, the contractors are bound by the same
standards of conduct as the military.
The third prong of the Blackwater Rule stipulates that the
government contractor defense can be invoked by a private military
contractor if, in the absence of explicit contractual instructions, the
government substantively reviewed and approved the use of the
procedure prior to the event that led to liability. The third prong of the
Blackwater Rule borrows from lower court decisions involving supply
contractors as well as aspects of agency law.
After Boyle, lower courts struggled with the question of whether a
supply contractor who designed a specific defect, without governmental
instruction, could ever meet the requirements of the government
contractor defense.173 The court in Kerstetter v. Pacific Scientific Co.
held that when the government does not specify the exact defect in
question, a finding that the government substantively reviewed the
design of the equipment is sufficient to-prove that the contractor met the
170. While there is some recent debate as to what constitutes torture, a United States court has
concluded that official torture has reached the level of a violation ofjus cogens. See Siderman de
Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that "the right to be free from official
torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international law,
a norm ofjus cogens").
171. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940).
172. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
173. See, e.g., Kerstetter v. Pac. Scientific Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2000) (evaluating
whether an aircraft manufacturer could assert the government contractor defense when the
government did not prepare the specifications of the aircraft).
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precise specifications requirement. 17 4 The rationale behind decisions
such as Kerstetter is that even if the government does not design the
original equipment, the "length and breadth of the [government's]
experience with the [equipment]-and its decision to continue using it-' 7
amply establish government approval of the alleged design defects.' 1
These courts require proof that the government provided a "substantive
review or evaluation" of the product, prior to the event that led to
liability, in order to establish that the government approved the
design. 176 As a result, these courts have concluded that the government
exercised its discretion by sufficiently instructing the contractor as to the
design of the equipment as long as the government substantively
evaluated the equipment and requested its additional production.
The third prong of the Blackwater Rule borrows from the rule that
if a product is substantively reviewed by the government and the
government requests additional production, the manufacturer is
subsequently protected by the government contractor defense. This
prong governs situations where the private military contractor was not
specifically instructed how to perform a contractual obligation. For
example, in a contract for the delivery of supplies to a location, the
contractor may have been instructed by the government to deliver
supplies from point A to point B, but not instructed on how to get there.
If the contractor decided to take a specific route every time it fulfilled
the contract and the government substantively reviewed and approved
the choice to take the route, there is sufficient evidence that the
government exercised its discretion by instructing the contractor to
continue taking the route. As a result, the contractor would meet the
requirements of the third prong of the Blackwater Rule.
The third prong of the Blackwater Rule is similar to the ratification
doctrine developed by agency law. 177 In an agency relationship, a
principal can ratify the act of an agent who is performing a task outside
of the agent's actual authority.1 78 In order to ratify the act, the principal
must have knowledge of the material facts about the agent's act and the
principal must behave in a way that justifies a reasonable assumption

174. Id.
175. Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 1986).
176. Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989) (differentiating
how governmental discretion is exercised when the government offers an extensive review of a
product and approves of its use as compared to merely accepting the product without a thorough
review, a process known as "rubber-stamping").
177.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01 (2006).

178. Seeid.
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that it consents to the agent's act. 179 If these conditions are present the
the agent as if actual authority
principal is bound by the conduct 1of
80
existed at the time of the agent's act.
Similar to the ratification doctrine of agency law, the third prong of
the Blackwater Rule does not require the government's approval of the
contractor's conduct to be explicit. The third prong of the Blackwater
Rule applies even if the government, after substantively reviewing the
procedure, did not tell the contractor to continue performing the
procedure in question. Using the previous example of the private
military contractor choosing to take an unspecified route, the
government could impliedly approve of this procedure if it substantively
reviewed the choice to take the route, accepted the benefits of the
contract, and failed "to make"a timely disaffirmance of the unauthorized
acts." 18 1 Based on the Blackwater Rule, since the government evaluated
the activity, and the government made a discretionary decision not to
reprimand the contractor for exceeding its authority, the private military
contractor is protected by the government contractor defense for liability
arising from 4aking this route in future situations.
The Blackwater Rule slightly diverges from agency law because
not only does the private military contractor need to establish that the
procedure being used was approved by the government, the contractor
must also demonstrate that this approval occurred prior to the event that
led to liability. 82 The reason for this distinction is that the Blackwater
Rule protects the government's discretion exercised while directing the
contractor's actions. The government, however, cannot instruct the
contractor on how to act if the conduct has already been completed. In
contrast, by approving a procedure extensively used by the private
military contractor, the government exercises its discretion by directing
the contractor to continue using the specific procedure for all future
missions. As a result, while the contractor is performing these missions
that occur after the government approved the continued use of the
179. See id.Ratification can be "inferred by words, conduct or silence on the part of the
principal that reasonably indicates its desire to affirm the unauthorized act." Progressive Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Ehrhardt, 518 A.2d 151, 156 (Md. 1986). The court in Ehrhardt went on to state that
"[c]ircumstances that suggest an intent to ratify include: receipt and retention of the benefits of the
unauthorized transaction ... and a failure to make a timely disaffirmance of the unauthorized acts."
Id. (citations omitted).
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01.
181. SeeEhrhardt, 518 A.2d at 156.
182. In addition, unlike agency law, the private military contractor does not need to prove that
an agency relationship existed between the contractor and the government to fulfill the third prong
of the Blackwater Rule. The Blackwater Rule merely borrows from agency law; it does not establish
the existence of an agency relationship.
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procedure, the contractor is merely following the instruction of the
contractor defense appropriately
government and the government 1 83
discretion.
government's
the
protects
Private military subcontractors may also invoke the Blackwater
Rule as long as they can establish that the government exercised
discretion with regard to their conduct. In order for a private military
subcontractor to meet this requirement, the subcontractor must prove
that the government permitted the general contractor to hire the
subcontractor as well as meet the requirements of one of the prongs of
the Blackwater Rule. 184 This additional requirement ensures that the
government contemplated and permitted the use of subcontractors for
security functions. This condition is necessary because the government
cannot exercise discretion over the conduct of a subcontractor if the
government does not allow the use of subcontractors to perform the
conduct in question.
Additionally, private military subcontractors need to prove that the
government exercised discretion over their conduct by satisfying one of
the three prongs of the Blackwater Rule. For example, if the
subcontractor wishes to assert the government contractor defense based
on the first prong of the Blackwater Rule, it must prove that the
performance contract between the general contractor and the government
provided precise specifications and that these same provisions were
included in the subcontract. In order for the subcontractor to prove that it
satisfied the requirements of the second prong of the Blackwater Rule,
the performance contract between the general contractor and the
government must have explicitly and lawfully permitted the
subcontractor to use its own discretion. Finally, in order for the
subcontractor to successfully prove that it met the conditions of the third
prong of the Blackwater Rule, the government must have been placed on
notice that the private military contractor was using the procedure that
led to liability and the government must have subsequently approved the

183. This prong may be the most difficult for private military contractors to prove in court
because the current lack of governmental oversight over contractors makes it unlikely that a
contractor would be able to prove that the government reviewed the use of a specific procedure.
184. The extension of the Blackwater Rule to private military subcontractors follows the same
reasoning courts have used to extend the Boyle rule to supply subcontractors. See, e.g., Maguire v.
Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67, 72 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that since the government
exercised its discretion by requesting a specific helicopter part, the subcontracted manufacturer of
that part was permitted to assert the government contractor defense); Feldman v. Kohler Co., 918
S.W.2d 615, 625 (Tex. App. 1996) (reasoning that if a subcontractor was subjected to liability
resulting from the government's discretion, the subcontractor would raise its price to manufacture
the part and the general contractor would, accordingly, raise the price it charged to the government).
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use of the procedure, prior to the event that led to liability. The standards
governing the applicability of the Blackwater Rule for subcontractors
ensure that governmental discretion is protected regardless of whether a
general contractor or subcontractor is carrying out the government's
wishes. 185
The Blackwater Rule is a necessary extension of the government
contractor defense. The current test used to determine the applicability
of the government contractor defense, the Boyle rule, was tailored to
supply contracts and is insufficient to govern the conduct of private
military contractors fulfilling performance contracts. The standards
prescribed by the Blackwater Rule maintain the aim of the Boyle rule,
protecting the government's discretion, while tailoring them to the
specific situations encountered by private military contractors. The result
is a comprehensive rule intended to protect the government's decision to
use private military contractors in order to face the uncertainties of war.
VI.

NORDAN: AN APPLICATION OF THE "BLACKWATER RULE"

The facts of Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC,
although partially available, are presently lacking in some of the details
186
necessary to fully apply the Blackwater Rule to this case.
Nevertheless, this Part uses the facts that are publicly available to
illustrate how the Blackwater Rule would prevent Blackwater from
being able to assert the government contractor defense in connection
with its liability arising from the Fallujah incident. Furthermore, this
Part describes what additional facts would be necessary to help
Blackwater satisfy the conditions of the Rule.
Based on the facts currently available to the public, Blackwater
would not satisfy the requirements of the first prong of the Blackwater
Rule. In order to meet the standards of the first prong of the Rule, the
government must provide precise specifications for the fulfillment of a
performance contract and the contractor must comply with these
specifications. In cases involving subcontractors, the analysis requires a
four step inquiry in order to determine if (1) the government prescribed
precise specifications to the general contract, (2) the government
allowed the general contractor to hire subcontractors to fulfill these
185. The Blackwater Rule applies to all subcontractors regardless of how far they are removed
from the general contractor because to deny the defense to these subcontractors would produce the
same result as "that disapproved by the Supreme Court in Boyle." See Feldman, 918 S.W.2d at 625.
However, the Blackwater Rule becomes a much tougher standard the firther removed a
subcontractor is from the government, as further explained in Part VI of this Note.
186.

382 F. Supp. 2d 801, 804-06 (E.D.N.C. 2005).
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duties, (3) the general contractor included the same precise
specifications prescribed by the government in its contract with the
subcontractor, and (4) the subcontractor complied with these
specifications. Applying this standard to the facts of Nordan, Blackwater
would187fail to meet the requirements of the first prong of the Blackwater
Rule.
Blackwater would fail to meet the first three steps of this inquiry
because the government never permitted the general contractors to
provide the security services that led to the liability. Congressional
hearings on the subject of private military contractors have revealed that
the government specifically prohibited the hiring of private security
contractors in its contracts with both general contractors KBR and
Fluor. 188 Since the government prohibited the general contractors and
any subcontractors from carrying out security functions, Blackwater
would obviously not be able to prove that the government provided the
general contractors with precise specifications. Given these facts,
Blackwater would fail to meet the standards of the first prong of the
Blackwater Rule.
If, however, the facts suggested that the government allowed the
general contractor to subcontract in order to provide the government
with security functions and prescribed precise specifications to the
general contractors, KBR and Fluor, these facts would be sufficient to
satisfy the first two steps of the inquiry as to whether Blackwater met the
requirements of the first prong of the Blackwater Rule. Additionally, in
order to meet the conditions of the first prong of the Blackwater Rule,
the precise specifications would have to be duplicated in the contract
between Regency and Blackwater.

187. See id.
188. The Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey, wrote a letter to Congressman Christopher
Shays, dated July 14, 2006, stating, "Under the provisions of the LOGCAP contract, the U.S.
military provides all armed forces protection for KBR, unless otherwise directed. Additionally, the
LOGCAP contract states that KBR personnel cannot carry weapons without the explicit approval of
the theater commander." IraqiReconstruction: Reliance on PrivateMilitary Contractorsand Status
Report: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 10th Cong. 184 (2007)
(Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform) (quoting a letter
from the Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey). Chairman Henry A. Waxman also noted that
"Fluor Corp. has a similar provision in its contract with the Air Force, contractor force protection.
The U.S. Government will provide for the security of contractor personnel in convoys .. ."Id. at
183. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Tina Ballard, and Fluor Senior Director of Corporate
Security, Tom Flores; both testified before the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform that these contracts prevented both KBR and Fluor from subcontracting for private security.
See id at 158, 183-84.
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Some of the contract provisions included in the contract between
Regency and Blackwater were specific enough to satisfy the
requirements of this step. For example, the contract between Regency
and Blackwater stated that "to provide tactically sound and fully mission
capable Protective Security Details, the minimum team size is six
operators with a minimum of two vehicles to support ESS
movements." 189 If this provision was included in the general contract
between the government and the general contractor and duplicated in the
subcontract, it would be specific enough to meet the requirements of the
first prong of the Blackwater Rule.
Assuming that this provision met the requirements for precise
specifications and was included in the general contract with the
government, and assuming that the government permitted the
subcontracting of these duties, Blackwater would still need to comply
with the precise specifications in order to fulfill the requirements of the
first prong of the Blackwater Rule. Based on the facts currently
available, Blackwater would not satisfy this step because when the
Fallujah incident occurred, the team size had been cut from six operators
to four, in violation of the terms of the contract.' 90 Since Blackwater
failed to comply with the terms of its contract with Regency, it did not
comply with the precise specifications and thus would fail to meet the
standards of the fourth step of this inquiry. If, instead, (1) the
government prescribed precise specifications to Fluor or KBR, (2) the
government allowed KBR or Fluor to hire subcontractors to fulfill these
duties, (3) the same precise specifications prescribed by the government
were included in the subcontractor with Blackwater, and (4) Blackwater
complied with these specifications, Blackwater would have been able to
assert the government contractor defense based on the first prong of the
Blackwater Rule.
Based on the facts publicly available, Blackwater would also not be
able to meet the requirements of the second prong of the Blackwater
Rule. In order to satisfy the second prong of the Blackwater Rule, the
private military contractor would have to prove that the government
explicitly and lawfully delegated its discretion to the contractor. In the
case of a subcontractor, this would require that (1) the government
authorized the general contractor to subcontract for the task, and (2) the
government explicitly delegated its discretion to the subcontractor. As
discussed when analyzing the first prong of the Blackwater Rule, the

189. Agreement for Security Services, supra note 52, at 15.
190. See PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS, supranote 11, at 10.
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government did not authorize the use of private security services in its
contract with general contractors KBR and Fluor. 191 As a result,
Blackwater would be unable to satisfy the standards of the second prong
of the Blackwater Rule.
If, rather than prohibiting the use of security contractors, the
government explicitly delegated its discretion to the private military
subcontractor in a manner similar to that exemplified in the contract
between Blackwater and Regency, Blackwater would have a much a
stronger case for proving that it met the requirements of the second
prong of the Blackwater Rule. In the contract between Regency and
Blackwater, Regency specifically delegated its discretion to Blackwater.
For example, Article 1.2.3 of the contract states that "BLACKWATER
shall, at all times, have complete authority and responsibility to make
decisions regarding the suitability for movement required by ESS and
the type and level of protection required for ESS personnel."1' 92 In
addition, Article 1.2.4 states that "BLACKWATER shall be under an
absolute duty at all times to exercise its own reasonable discretion with
respect to safe operations, movement of ESS personnel and the type and
level of [s]ecurity [s]ervices provided to ESS .... ,,19 3
The second prong of the Blackwater Rule would have been satisfied
if the government included these same provisions in its contract with
Fluor and KBR and explicitly permitted the general contractors to
delegate this discretion to private military subcontractors. This
application of the government contractor defense would achieve the
purpose of the defense, protecting the government's discretion, because
the government would be making the decision to delegate its discretion
to the subcontractor and the subcontractor would be carrying out the will
of the sovereign.
Given the facts publicly available, Blackwater would also fail to
meet the requirements of the third prong of the Blackwater Rule. The
third prong of the Blackwater Rule requires that in the absence of
explicit contractual instructions, the government must have substantively
reviewed the use of the procedure that led to liability and the
government must have subsequently approved the use of the procedure,
prior to the event that led to liability. In this case, the government would
have needed to know that Blackwater was performing these convoys
with fewer men than stipulated in the contract. In addition, the
191.

See Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Status Report:

Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 158, 183-84 (2007).
192. Agreement for Security Services, supra note 52, at 2.
193. Id.
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government would also have had to be informed that the equipment did
not comply with the standards stated in the contract in order to
substantively review these practices. However, not only was there
insufficient governmental oversight to place the government on notice as
to the actions of Blackwater,' 94 but the conduct in question had never
been performed by Blackwater on a previous occasion. 195 As a result,
Blackwater would not meet the requirements of the third prong of the
Blackwater Rule.
If, on the other hand, Blackwater had performed the contractual
duties in the same manner, on a previous occasion, these facts would
strengthen the argument that Blackwater met the requirements of the
third prong of the Blackwater Rule. In addition to these facts, however,
Blackwater would also need to prove that the government substantively
reviewed the procedures taken by Blackwater and approved of these
practices, either explicitly or by failing to make a timely disaffirmance.
If Blackwater was able to prove all of these assertions, it would be
immune from liability based on the third prong of the Blackwater Rule.
Based on Congressional testimony as well as an overview of the
procurement system, the requirements of the third prong of the
Blackwater Rule create an extremely difficult standard for private
military contractors to meet. Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army, testified that "to my knowledge, we don't have any system

194. At the time of the Fallujah incident, the general contractors and the government were
unaware that Blackwater was performing security services on their behalf. George Seagle, Director
of the Security, Government, and Infrastructure Division of KBR testified that during an
investigation, following the Fallujah ambush, KBR was "initially told by ESS and Blackwater, both,
that Blackwater was not contracted to KBR." See Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private
Military Contractors and Status Report: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, 110th Cong. 184 (2007). Tom Flores, Senior Director of Corporate Security for Fluor, also
testified that he was unaware that Blackwater was performing security operations under the ESS
contract on the day of the ambush. Id. In addition, Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, wrote a
letter to Chairman Waxman, stating that when the issue was first brought to the Army's attention,
"[b]ased on all available documentation in contract files and on correspondence from [KBR], [the
U.S. Army Material Command] was unable to substantiate a link" between Blackwater and KBR.
Letter from Francis J. Harvey, Sec'y, Army, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform (Feb. 6, 2007) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). This letter,
along with the Congressional testimony, suggests that the general contractors and the government
were oblivious to the fact that Blackwater was performing security functions on their behalf.
195. On the date of the Fallujah ambush, Blackwater was performing one of the first missions
attempted pursuant to its assigned contract with Regency. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 39. As a
result, even if there was oversight sufficient to place the government on notice about the actions of
Blackwater, the government would not have been able to ratify this conduct because it had not been
performed on other occasions prior to the incident that led to the claimed liability.
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where we automatically keep track of... every subcontract[or].' 9 6 An
October 2005 report by the Inspector General of the Defense Department
found that contracting officials failed to develop and implement
adequate surveillance plans on eighty-seven percent of contracts
reviewed.197 These systemic problems make it unlikely that a contractor
would be able to prove the government reviewed the use of the
procedure in question.
Blackwater's failure to meet the requirements of the Blackwater
Rule, based on the facts of Nordan, is a representative illustration of the
strength of the Rule. This Rule does not create a weak standard that can
easily be reached in the absence of governmental discretion. In this case,
it would have required the government to contemplate the use of
subcontractors and exercise its discretion by strengthening its role while
drafting the contract, explicitly delegating its discretion, or sufficiently
overseeing the conduct in question. This increased governmental role
would benefit the military contracting industry as a whole and result in a
greater amount of contemplation, transparency, and accountability in
drafting and performing security contracts.
The Blackwater Rule gives the parties who are needed to
implement these changes, the contractors and the government, an
incentive to do so. Private military contractors would encourage an
effort to work more closely with the government in order to receive
greater immunity from liability. In addition, the government would also
welcome these efforts because the costs charged by the contractors
would decline based on the contractors' reduced vulnerability to
lawsuits. As a result, many of the problems associated with private
military contractors would diminish as the law begins to creep into this
world of virtual lawlessness.
Erik D. Prince, Chairman and CEO of Blackwater, has already
expressed a desire to work with Congress and the executive branch to
The
"increase accountability, oversight, and transparency. ' '
Blackwater Rule not only furthers the purpose of the government
contractor defense, immunizing the government's discretion, but also
provides an incentive for the government and private military
196. Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and Status Report:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov 't Reform, 110th Cong. 183 (2007).
197. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INSPECTOR GENERAL: ACQUISITION: CONTRACT SURVEILLANCE FOR
SERVICE CONTRACTS, REP. NO. 2006-010,4 (2005).

198. Hearing on Blackwater USA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (prepared statement of Erik D. Prince, CEO of Blackwater) (quoting
Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20071003153621 .pdf.
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contractors to work more closely together in order to achieve the goals
of the sovereign. By encouraging this type of cooperation and filling the
legal void left in the wake of Boyle, the Blackwater Rule provides a
sensible solution to a problem that has far-reaching national security
implications.
Justin A. Jacobs*
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